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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16838 
This is an action brought by respondent asking 
the trial court for a mandatory injunction ordering the appel-
lants to accept the unpaid balance due under a land purchase 
contract and to execute and deliver a warranty deed to the 
property to the respondent, or in the alternative, to relieve 
the respondent from the harshness of the retaking of the pro-
perty by the seller without compensation to the buyer pursuant 
to the contract and asking the court to order the appellants 
to return to respondent the money paid by respondent on the 
contract or such part as the Court might deem equitable. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury on June 14, 15 and 
18, 1979, before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock sitting in 
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equity without a jury. The Court found in favor of the appel-
lants and against the respondent on the demand for a mandatory 
injunction requiring delivery of title to the property. The 
Court found for the respondent and against the appellants 
holding that the retaking of the property by the appellants 
·was an wholly unreasonable penalty and denying literal enforce-
ment of the contract terms. The Court entered judgment 
requiring a reimbursement to the respondent buyer of $14,121.54. 
Appellants filed a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment or in the Alternative for 
a New Trial, which Motion was denied by the Court on December 
24, 1979. The appellants appealed that decision of the 
Court and its denial of the Motion to Amend Findings or in 
the Alternative for a New Trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT.ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the Court reverse the trial 
court, to apply the Alaska law to the case and to declare that 
the retaking of the property under all of the circumstances then 
existing was a reasonable application of the contract terms. 
Appellants seek to have this court rule that the appellants 
did not receive anything more than that which they were entitled 
to under the contract and that respondent is not entitled to 
any recovery in this proceeding. 
-:?-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 3, 1974, the respondent, as buyer, 
entered into a real estate contract with the appellants, as 
sellers, (Ex. 1) for a tract of land of approximately 27 
acres known as Tract "B" of the Musk Ox Subdivision located 
near Fairbanks, Alaska. The contract provided for a $2,000.00 
down payment and monthly payments of a minimum of $350.00 
commencing December 1, 1974. In addition to the monthly 
payments, the buyer was obligated by the contract to pay 
$1,000.00 on November 1, 1974, $5,000.00 on February 1, 1975, 
$5,000.00 on August 1, 1975, and $3,000.00 each succeeding 
February 1 and August 1 until November 1, 1978, when the entire 
unpaid balance would be due. 
On the same day as the signing of the contract, the 
parties executed an escrow agreement, (Ex. 23) and on that 
day buyer and seller went to the off ice of attorney Gene Belland. 
At the office, appellant, Dwane Sykes, read the escrow instruc-
tions and documents prepared to be executed as Exhibit 23 to 
the respondent. (Testimony of Dwane Sykes, Record, 256: 5-10). 
The contract and the escrow instructions required that the 
payments under the contract would be paid to the First National 
Bank of Fairbanks, Alaska. Mr. Sykes informed the plaintiff 
that there was an existing mortgage on the property at the time 
of purchase and the agreements instructed the bank to apply any 
funds received to the payment of such mortgage upon the pro-
perty. (Ex. 23, Escrow Instructions, paragraph 3, subparagraph 
-3-
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b; Record 256: 13-18). After the execution of the a~reements, 
the appellant, Dwane Sykes, moved to the State of Utah. The 
respondent variously lived in Florida, California, and Brussels, 
Belgium. Payments were to be made to the escrow department of 
the First National Bank of Fairbanks pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
the real estate contract, (Ex. 1) and the escrow instructions 
(Ex. 23). 
On November 16, 1975, appellant, Sykes, sent a letter 
to respondent enclosing a proposed contract of sale on two 
additional parcels upon which they had been negotiating. The 
respondent counteroffered to purchase Lot 13 only setting forth 
the terms. (Reply, Ex. 18). 
On December 3, 1975, appellant, Sykes, responded 
(Ex. 2) accepting the counteroffer and enclosing a purchase 
contract for Lot 13 exactly as the counteroffer of respondent. 
Respondent never made the payments on Lot 13 as offered in 
writing (Ex. 18) and accepted by the appellant (Ex. 3). This 
failure to complete later became a problem in the parties' 
dealings. In that letter, (Ex. 2) appellant, Sykes, gave 
notice to the plaintiff by the second postscript that "Fairbanks 
bank indicates they have not received payments on the Musk Ox 
escrow 10557 (Ex. 23) and informed respondent that he was 
several months behind. Responding to the December 3, 1975 
letter by a letter of December 17, 1975, (Ex. 19) respondent 
said, "Re: the February payment, will get it into bank as 
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early as I can. Also, I've written to the bank on being in 
arrears - my records indicate up to date currently, so 
upon their reply we can check out the discrepency." [Emphasis 
supplied] The testimony of respondent shows that the payments 
recorded by the bank were the only payments paid. (Record 205: 
14-23; Record 215: 6-12). It further.shows that respondent 
made all the pay~ents personally and not by any other person. 
(Record 220:6-12}. Respondent knew he was delinquent at all 
times, (Record 220: 19-22; Record 211: 5-16) and that his 
letter claiming that his records showed him to be current, was 
a misrepresentation given to the appellant regarding his payments 
to the bank (Ex. 19). 
On the 29th of December, 1975, Steve Arnold, appellant's 
accountant, wrote to the respondent (Ex. 3) regarding the delin-
quency in the escrow which informed respondent that at that 
time he was four month's delinquent and that by the time of the 
receipt of the letter, would be five month's delinquent at 
$350.00 per month or $1,750.00. That letter further informed 
him that appellant, Sykes, was depending upon the payments on 
the contract by respondent to~meet Sykes commitments on the 
mortgage to First National Bank of Fairbanks and that it was 
subject to immediate termination of both his interests and 
Mr. Sykes if payments were not brought current. Exhibit 3(a) 
attached to that letter shows the calculations of payments 
received, compared to the payments due up through December of 
1975. 
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On the same date, December 29, 1975, appellant wrote 
to the First National Bank Escrow Department, (Ex. 22 and Ex. 
27) with a copy to respondent requesting and authorizing the 
escrow department to automatically make payments from the 
escrow to the note owed to First National Bank to keep the note 
current. He further informed respondent,of the dependency of 
Mr. Sykes upon his monthly payments to meet the payments to the 
bank. 
Respondent did not correct the $1,750.00 delinquency 
as requested and on February 11, 1976, respondent, by letter 
to appellant, Sykes (Ex. 14) again misrepresented that the bank 
records were inaccurate and claiming that a $700.00 and two 
$350.00 checks were not reflected and that he had sent to the 
bank a tracer on these matters. 
Because of the repeated claims by Mr. Morris that 
he had made payments that were not shown by the bank, Walt 
Hick, an accountant for Mr. Sykes, sent a communication to the 
bank with a copy to respondent attempting to verify if there 
was any differences in payments received and what the bank 
records showed (Ex. 21) • 
On September 2, 1976, the plaintiff requested a "good 
discount" for prepayment on the Musk Ox property and conditioned 
his purchase of Lots 13 and 14 at a lesser price upon obtaining 
a discount, if a discount acceptable to him could be allowed 
(Ex. 20). 
-6-
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On September 30 or October 2, 1976, respondent, 
in a telephone conversation with Dwane Sykes, conditioned 
payoff at the Musk Ox property upon obtaining a discount. 
Mr. Sykes denied that request (Record 80: 12-23; Record 166: 
4-9). In that same telephone conversation, appellant Sykes 
informed respondent that it was very important that he keep the 
payments at the bank current because if he was delinquent, he 
would be terminated under the contract. Mr. Sykes informed 
respondent that Mr. Sykes' payments to the bank were 100 per-
cent dependent upon respondent's payments to the escrow account 
under the purchase agreement. Respondent informed Mr. Sykes 
that he would personally go into the bank and verify his escrow 
account status and bring it current (Record 165-167; Record 80: 
2-16) . 
On October 14, 1976, the respondent telephoned 
appellant Sykes at Orem, Utah and Dennis Sykes, appellant's 
brother, got on the extension telephone and overheard and 
described the conversation in his deposition (Record 82). 
Respondent again asked for a $1,000.00 discount as a condition 
of prepayment on the Musk Ox contract. Dwane Sykes declined to 
give the discount. Dwane Sykes again told respondent that 
the accountant's records in Utah showed respondent delinquent 
and that the bank had not provided any information to verify 
or refute that (Record 83: 6-8). Respondent misrepresented 
-7-
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that he had been into the bank and had already brought his 
payments completely current, "having just within the past few 
days paid a major amount covering some months, receipts of 
which perhaps had not reached Utah through the mails" (Record 
83: 9-13). The record of payments paid show that no payments 
were paid by respondent after August 2, 1976 (Ex .. 5). Respon-
dent again misrepresented to Mr. Sykes payments ostensibly 
made in Alaska (Record 82: 8-12). In that conversation, 
Dwane Sykes informed the respondent that he would not permit 
any delinquency on his Musk Ox sale to respondent (Record 83: 
21-23). 
In early November, Mr. Sykes learned that respondent 
was seriously delinquent on the payments on the Musk Ox pro-
perty and that respondent had not made payments in October 
as he had represented. Respondent had not kept the contract 
current nor had he brought any payments current over the entire 
period of the contract. Appellant further learned that respon-
dent's representations had all been false representations of 
payments which respondent knew had not been paid (Record 83: 
26-32; Record 84: 1-4). 
On November 11, 1976, appellant's accountant, Walt 
Hick, served the notice of termination under the contract on 
the bank with copies to respondent, both in Mango, Florida 
and Brussels, Belgium (Ex. 4). 
-8-
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After the termination, appellant, Sykes, offered 
reinstatement of the Musk Ox contract by a telephone conversa-
tion between Sykes and Morris on November 18, 1976. That 
offer of reinstatement was confirmed by a reply message 
(Ex. 29) of November 19, 1976. The respondent declined to 
reinstate. 
By a letter dated November 24, 1976 {Ex. 28) the 
bank demanded payment of a delinquency of $1,573.87 plus $339.39 
interest by December 8,. 19 7 6. 
On December 27, 1976 appellant's attorney wrote to 
the respondent (Ex. 19) offering reinstatement and setting 
forth the requirements for bringing the account current, and 
set January 25, 1977 as the expiration of the offer of reinstate-
ment. 
On the 18th of January, 1977, the respondent declined 
the reinstatement and said he found the terms unacceptable 
(Ex. 11). No tender of any payment to bring the contract current 
or to make any payments under the contract were ever made by 
the respondent {Record 224: 24-30). On the same date, January 
18, 1977, appellant's attorney sent a further letter to 
respondent (Ex. 25) reiterating the privilege of reinstatement 
and the expiration date of reinstatement offer for January 
25, 1977. 
On January 28, 1977, appellant's attorney again 
wrote to the respondent respondent reminding him of the rein-
statement offers made on the 18th of November, 1976 in a telephone 
-9-
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call with Mr. Sykes, the reiteration of that offer in the 
November 19 Memo from Mr. Sykes to respondent (Ex. 29); 
the reinstatement offer of December 27, 1976; and informed 
him that if he did not wish to reinstate, that was up to 
him but, since he had passed the January 25, 1977 expiration 
date of the reinstatement offer, the presumption of the appel-
lants was that he did not wish to reinstate. Respondent never 
communicated an answer to appellant's attorney. 
On February 9, i977, the bank informed Mr. Sykes 
that unless the $3,318.68 delinquency was paid within thirty 
(30) days, that the bank would declare the entire unpaid balance 
on the mortgage due and accelerate the note and foreclose the 
deed of trust inunediately (Ex. 30). 
The Sykes were thus faced with an imminent foreclo-
sure of their Musk Ox property by the bank under its trust 
deed. They were located in Utah and the property was in 
Fairbanks, Alaska. It was mid-winter and the property was 
totally inaccessible. Mr. Sykes attempted to refinance the 
mortgage payment to pay the bank out (Record 299: l; Record 
300: 20-30). Appellants, after several attempts to sell the 
property, obtained a sale of the property to the only market 
available, a buyer who had previously purchased property from 
appellants and would rely upon their statement as to the 
property without an examination of it. They sold the property 
under such distress circumstances to John Iverson, their 
-10-
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brother-in-law, for the unpaid balance owed by the respondent 
upon the purchase contract. No windfall profits were obtained 
by the appellants as a result of the sale. They only received 
what they would have received had the respondent completed the 
payments under his contract. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE ALASKA LAW ON 
FORFEITURE AND DAMAGES. 
In this matter the trial court indicated that the 
law of Alaska was the applicable law, but indicated that the 
Court did not believe that the-Alaska law was significantly 
different than Utah law. Thereafter, the trial court dealt 
with the case on the basis of applying established principles 
of law under Utah decisions more familiar to the Court. The 
Utah Court in applying Utah law has never applied a strict 
forfeiture in a real estate contract. It has applied various 
formulas requiring the Court to take into account the reason-
able rental value for the period of time the purchaser has been 
in possession of the property, interest which could have been 
earned had the payments been met, damages to the property and 
loss of bargain. This Court, applying Utah law, has generally 
allowed a refund to the defaulting purchaser for the excess 
over the reasonable damages of the vendor calculated under a 
variety of formulas which is considered to be a windfall to the 
vendor and reimbursable to the vendee. 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Alaskan law is considerably different than Utah 
law. The Alaska Court does recognize the right of a vendor to 
enforce the provisions of a forfeiture in the event of default 
by the vendee. In 1967 the Alaska Court, speaking in Lonas v. 
Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities Co.~ 432 P.2d 603 (1967) 
construed a real estate contract containing a provision almost 
identical to the contract provision on forfeiture contained in 
the contract which is the subject matter of this action (Ex. 
1). The provision in the Lonas case reads at page 605: 
read: 
Time is of the essence of this contract, 
and in case of failure of the said pur-
chasers to make either of the payments 
or perform any of the covenants on their 
part, this contract shall be forfeited and 
determined at the election of the said 
vendor; and the said purchasers shall 
forfeit all payments made by them on 
this contract and all rights acquired 
hereunder, and such payments shall be 
retained by the said vendor as liquidated 
damages, and they shall have the right 
to re-enter and take possession of said 
land and premises and every part thereof. 
In the case now before the Court, the contract provis~ 
Time is of the essence of this contract, 
and in the event of failure of buyer to 
make any payment falling due hereunder 
within thirty days after due date thereof, 
or to abide any other obligation herein-
undertaken, the seller may, at any time 
while such failure continues, terminate 
this contract and all purchase rights 
herein afforded to buyer, and pursuant thereto 
may re-enter and retake possession of said 
real estate, and all payments made thereto-
fore shall be retained·by the seller as 
liquidated damages for failure of performance 
hereunder by the buyer. 
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605: 
The Alaska Court stated in the Lonas case at page 
The forfeiture provision is not made 
exclusive. In such a case, the seller 
is entitled to pursue, in addition to the 
remedy specifically mentioned in the 
contract , any other remedy which the 
law affords. The seller in this case was 
not limited to the remedy of forfeiture 
of the contract, but could seek judg-
ment for monies past due and for specific 
performance. [Emphasis supplied] 
The Alaska law thus makes it clear that the seller is entitled 
to the remedy provided in the contract, of forfeiture of the 
contract, if he so elects. 
In Alaska.Placer Company v. Richard E. Lee, Alaska, 
455 P.2d 218 (1969) the Alaska Supreme Court distinguished 
the earlier cases of Land Development, Inc. v. Padgett, 
369.P.2d 888 (Alaska 1962) and Jameson v. Wurtz, 396 P.2d 
68 (Alaska 1964) which the court said stood for the propo-
sition that under some circumstances it may be inequitable 
to enforce a forfeiture because the loss to the buyers would 
be all out of proportion to the injury to the seller, and 
held in that case at page 229: 
This is not a case where appellant sat 
idly by, registered no objections, and 
then attempted to forfeit appellees' 
interest under the contract at a time 
when it was too late for appellees to 
remedy their f alure to perform. 
and further said: 
We find that there was not a waiver by 
appellant of its right of forfeiture 
under the contract. Nor did the notice 
of forfeiture come too late to be effective. 
-13-
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Thus, the Alaska Court recognizes the right of the vendor to 
forfeit out the interest of the vendee when the losses of the 
vendor are not disproportionate to those of the vendee. 
In the case now before the Court, the forfeiture 
and subsequent sale of the property by the vendor, appellant 
Sykes, produced less than the amount of funds that would have 
been produced had the vendee made his payments as required by 
the contract and the determination by the trial court to refund 
monies paid by the vendee·imposed all of the losses in the 
matter upon the vendor and none upon the vendee, who was the 
defaulting party in the matter. 
In the 1972 case of McCormick v. Grove, Alaska 495 
P.2d 1268, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the trial court 
properly had the discretion to refuse to enforce the forfeiture 
because, "the sellers never 'hinted' that they would terminate 
because of the late payments." In the case now before the 
Court, not only had the sellers sent two notices citing the 
delinquencies and informing buyers they were subject to termi-
nation (Exs. 2 and 3) but had several telephone communications 
repeatedly making demands to keep the accounts current, indi-
cating the failure to do so would cause termination of the 
contract. (Record 80: 12-23; Record 166:4-9; Record 82: 8-12; 
Record 83: 6-23) 
The case cited in the Lonas case of Land Development, 
Inc. v. Padgett, supra., was decided in 1962 and in that case 
-14-
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the buyers had paid $9,500.00, leaving a balance due of only 
$2,400.00. The Court refused to enforce literally the for-
feiture provision of the contract and this was upheld by the 
Supreme Court. The Court noting that the vendor's rights 
" ••. were fully protected; for if the buyers failed to pay the 
balance owing by the time specified in the judgment, then 
their interest in the property would then be entirely forfeited 
and the seller would regain possession." Id. 889 [Emphasis 
added] In the circumstance before the Court, the bank had served 
upon the seller-appellant notice of intended forfeiture and 
foreclosure of the trust deed owed by seller to First National 
Bank of Fairbanks. In the event of such foreclosure by the 
bank upon the seller as a result of buyers defaults, seller 
would have lost all interest in the property. Vendors' rights 
were not fully protected as in Land Development v. Padgett, 
supra. In this matter, seller-appellant did not obtain by the 
sale to Iverson more than what he would have obtained had the 
respondent-buyer met his payments. In the Land Development, 
Inc. v. Padgett case, supra., the Court said that the reason 
the trial court has been justified in refusing to enforce the 
forefeiture provision was because there was no anticipated 
losses to seller and the losses to buyer were out of propor-
tion. In this case, the effect of the trial court's ruling was 
to impose all loss on the appellant-sellers with no loss to the 
respondent-buyer. 
The other case cited by the Alaska court in support 
of the proposition that the Court under certain circumstances, 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has the discretion to ignore the contract provision, was 
Jamison v. Wurtz, supra., where the Court held that where the 
vendor had received 88.3% of the total purchase price and 
where the purchaser had tendered the balance of the purchase 
price into the Court at the time of institution of the suit, 
that it would have been inequitable for the Court to have 
enforced the literal provisions of the forfeiture under the 
contract. That is not the.circumstances in the case now before 
the Court. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska has further ruled that 
the ultimate aim of the Court rendering a decision where a 
vendee has defaulted in payments upon a land purchase contract 
in an equity proceeding challenging whether or not a forfeiture 
is to be allowed is exemplified in Ward v. Union Bond and Trust 
Co., 243 F.2d 476 (1957) wherein the court said at page 480: 
The ultimate aim in these proceedings 
in equity must be to save the respective 
parties harmless from loss or damage 
and,if just and equitable, place them in 
the status quo of their contract so as to 
permit them as vendor and vendee to each 
have the benefit of their respective barqains 
voluntarily entered into, ... not to be 
measured in the light or economics of 
subsequent events, but as of the day of the 
contract. 
The Court thus illustrated that the examination in equity 
should determine whether the results gave the parties the 
benefit of the bargain they would have had if the contract 
had been fully performed. The decision of the trial court in 
this matter took from the sellers the benefit of their bargain 
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to the benefit of the vendee when viewed through the entire 
proceeding and the course of events leading up to the termina-
tion. Such result was inequitable because vendee was the only 
defaulting party and vendors had committed no defaults. 
Another circumstance where the Alaska Court has 
refused to enforce literally the forfeiture provisions of a 
real estate contract is Williams v. DeLay, Alaska, 395 P.2d 
839 (1964) wherein the Court pointed out that in that circum-
stance, {a) there was a remaining unpaid balance of the purchase 
price of only $575.95, (b) this balance was tendered into 
Court by the buyers almost immediately after it had been ascer-· 
tained by the special master during the case, (c) the buyers 
had made valuable improvements upon the property and, (d) the 
property had appreciated considerably in value after execution 
of the contract. The Court held in conformity with the decision 
in Land Develompent v. Padgett, supra., that this would cause 
a loss to the buyers out of proportion to any injury that might 
be sustained by the sellers. 
In the case now before the Court, the trial Court did 
not weigh the losses to the seller as opposed to the losses 
of the buyer and did not apply the Alaska law as it had been 
cited herein in Lonas v. Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities 
Co., supra., and Alaska Placer Company v. Richard E. Lee, supra. 
Other decisions where the Alaska Court has indicated 
that in the event of a breach of contract that the responsibility 
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of the Court is to put the injured party, that is the non-
defaulting party, in the same position he would have been 
had the contract been fully performed are: Green v. Koslosky, 
Alaska, 384 P.2d 951 (1963); City of Whittier v. Whittier Fuel 
and Marine Corporation, Alaska, 577 P.2d 216 (1978) and McBain 
v. Pratt, Alaska, 514 P.2d 823 (1973). 
It is appellants' contention that the trial court 
ignored Alaska law and imposed upon the nondefaulting party 
the major losses in this case. 
There was no showing that the appellant-seller obtained 
any windfall profits as a result of the retaking. There was no 
showing that the losses on buyer were out of proportion to the 
losses to the seller. The result of the decision was to impose 
all losses on the non-defaulting seller. 
POINT II 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PLAINTIFF'S REPEATED DEFAULTS 
AND MISREPRESENTATIONS, THE TRIAL COURT, ERRONEOUSLY 
REFUSED TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT TERMS FOR TERMINATION 
OF CONTRACT RIGHTS. 
At time of trial, respondent testified that the 
bank records accurately reflected the record of all payments 
made by him under the contract. (Record 205: 14-23; Record 
215: 1-2) That record of payment was introduced as Exhibit 5 
in the proceeding. Attached to this brief as Appendix "A" is a 
chart showing the payments as required to be paid under the 
contract and payments as made by respondent, together with a 
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summary showing the deljnquency status of the contract at 
selected dates. The record of payments shows that respondent 
made the semi annual lump sum payments not as required by the 
contract, but within 30 to 45 days thereafter. The contract, 
however, required that each nonth respondent was to pay a 
monthly payment of $350.00. These payments were paid to the 
escrow agent, the bank in Fairbanks, and applied to the pay-
rnent of appellant's mortgage to the First National Bank of 
Fairbanks upon the same property. Respondent, himself, had 
made every payment that was made, personally, not by his wife, 
accountant, agent or by any other person. (Record 220: 6-12) 
Morris further recognized that he was obligated under the 
contract to pay a monthly payment every month of $350.00 plus 
the two lump sum payments the 1st of February and the 1st of 
August each year. (Record 220: 19-22) Such knowledge and 
/ 
understanding was made abundantly clear in the testimony of 
respondent (Record 222: 9-17): 
Mr. Jeffs: What I'm suggesting to you, Mr. 
Morris, is that when you were 
making these payments, whether 
you were in California, Montana, 
Fairbanks, Alaska or Brussels, 
Belgium you knew that you were 
to pay a payment of $350.00 every 
month? 
Mr. Morris: Yes sir. 
Mr. Jeffs: And you were the only one that 
handled the payment? 
Mr. Morris: Yes sir. 
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On December 3, 1975, appellant sent a letter (Ex. 2) 
to the respondent regarding additional property upon which the 
respondent was negotiating to purchase. As a postscript appel-
lant said, "Fairbanks bank indicates that they have not 
received payments on the Musk Ox escrow 10557; in fact, that 
it is several month's behind". On the date of that conununica-
tion, respondent was six installments of $350.00 each delinquent, 
(Appendix "A") 
On December 8, 1975, respondent made two monthly 
payments of $350.00. On December 17, respondent wrote to 
Mr. Sykes (Ex. 19) and said: 
"I have written the bank on being in arrears -
my records indicate up to date currently. 
So upon their reply, we can check out the 
discrepancy." 
This was at a time when Mr. Morris knew that he was delinquent 
on the contract and misrepresented his records to show himself 
to be current. 
On December 29, 1975 a letter was sent under the 
signature of Steve Arnold, the accountant for appellant herein, 
(Ex. 3) enclosing an accounting (Ex. 3(a)) of the $350.00 
monthly payments which were due. The letter pointed out that 
the December 8 payment covered the months of July and August 
but it was still four month's delinquent with another payment 
becoming due on January 1, 1976, making a total by the time 
the letter was received of $1,750.00 in arrears, or five monthfy 
installments. Respondent acknowledged his understanding of 
such delinquency (Record 211: .17-24). By Exhibit 3, the 
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Mt:Jvr/.s 
accountant informed Mr. ~: 
"I would appreciate your bringing these 
monthly payments current (which are 
required over and above the additional 
payments) immediately, because both yours 
and Mr. Sykes' separate notes are subject 
to immediate termination, which the bank 
could initiate at any moment." 
[Emphasis added] 
Respondent acknowledged his receipt of such notice and demand. 
(Record 212: 1-8; Record 212: 30; Record 213: 1-2) 
In the letter (Ex. 3) Mr. Arnold had acknowledged 
the payment on December 8, 1975 of $700.00 covering July and 
August payments. After receipt of that letter, the respondent 
sent a letter to the appellant Sykes dated February 11, 1976 
(Ex. 14) in which he represented: 
"Got the schedule of payment and there is 
a $700.00 check (Dec.) and two $350.00 
checks not reflected. Have written to 
the bank for them to trace out for me." 
The record of payments, Appendix "A", shows that only payment 
of $700.00 .paid during the entire payment period was the one on 
December 8 which had been acknowledged in Exhibit 3 and was 
shown on Exhibit 3{a). Respondent falsely and consciously 
misrepresented by Exhibit 14, four payments which he knew had 
not been paid since he had made all payments himself, and since 
his own testimony verifies that the payments made are as re-
fleeted by the bank's records. Nevertheless, he falsely and 
intentionally misrepresented his payments to the appellant 
Sykes with knowledge that since they were being paid to the 
bank in Alaska as escrow agent, Sykes would not have direct 
knowledge about the payments. 
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Respondent acknowledged that he never attempted to 
correct that delinquency. (Record 223: 4-7): 
Mr. Jeffs: But your letter, you acknowledge 
the letter of December 29, you 
were four months behind. When 
did you ever attempt to correct 
those payments? 
Mr. Morris: I never really corrected them, 
that's true ••. 
Respondent failed to correct the delinquencies despite the fact 
that he was handling all of the payments. (Record 223: 21-28) 
Mr. Jeffs: But you had within your control 
all of the payments that you had 
paid and the dates on which they 
were paid by the checks. 
Mr. Morris: Yes. 
Mr. Jeffs: And you had a copy of the contract 
and the escrow that told you the 
dates on when you were supposed to 
pay the payments? 
Mr. Morris: Yes. 
During this same period of time, respondent was 
making representations to appellant Sykes that he had additional 
money and wanted to buy more land. (Record 240: 22-30; Record 
231: 1-8) 
Exhibit 14 shows that respondent was extending over-
tures to purchase additional tracts of land during the period 
of delinquency. Exhibit 16 shows Sykes' response to a request 
for land. Exhibit 17, shows respondent's request for discount 
on tracts of land and respondent said he had cash on hand to 
purch~se more land but did nothing to correct the delinquency 
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and in fact thereafter, increased his delinquency. Exhibit 15 
shows respondent requesting Tract No. 13. Appendix "A" shows 
that as of July 8, 1976 respondent was five installments de-
linquent and never paid any monthly installments after July 8. 
He did pay the August 1, 1976 lump sum payment of $3,000.00, 
but failed to pay any additional payments. The testimony of 
respondent shows he knew he was delinquent on the payments 
for August, (Record 218: 22-28) September, (Record 218: 29-30) 
and that he never paid any monthly payments after July of 1976 
(Record 225: 8-14). 
As reconfirmed at trial, respondent's testimony on 
deposition referring to the communication from Mr. Hick, the 
accountant for Mr. Sykes, on August 13, 1976 (Record 224:16-23). 
"When you received a communication from Mr. 
Hick that you were some six or seven pay-
ments delinquent • • . 11 "Uh-huh" . • • 
"were you not aware that you had missed 
that many payments?" Answer: "Yes". 
Question: "You were aware? 11 • • • 
Answer: "I was aware that I was behind 
a certain amount of payments, six, four, 
five or seven; I knew I was behind. Isn't 
that what your answer was given?" 
Answer: "Yes sir." 
After the last payment, August 2, 1976, respondent 
had communication from Mr. Hick in behalf of Mr. Sykes (Ex. 
21). Thereafter, Mr. Sykes had telephone communication 
directly with respondent. The testimony of Mr. Sykes 
(Record 165: 6-30; Record 166: 1-30) shows that respondent 
was specifically asked about the delinquent status of the 
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payments to the escrow agent in Fairbanks. (Record 166: 
17) Mr. Sykes testified: 
"I asked him what the problem was that we 
couldn't get the bank to show us that the 
payments that he claimed had been made and 
I asked him, too, what the status on it 
was". He said, "the payments are paid and 
current". 
Again on October 14, 1976 respondent again called 
Mr. Sykes requesting a discount on the Musk Ox property. 
After Mr. Sykes had declined to grant the discount, the con-
versation turned to the delinquent status of the contract. 
Mr. Sykes directly confronted respondent on the delinquency. 
(Record 169: 4) 
"On that occasion, I pinned Mr. Morris down 
about what was going on on our accounting. 
He said he had been into the bank, his 
account was current, and he had made recent 
payments into the bank within the past few 
days". 
Again, the record of payments shows no such payments were 
ever made in October and it was a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion of payments made to mislead the appellant Sykes. These 
misrepresentations by respondent were corroborated in the 
deposition of De_nnis L. Sykes on written questions, which was 
admitted into evidence in lieu of his testimony. Dennis had 
overheard the conversation on the extension phone on October 
2, 1976 and again on October 14, 1976. (Record 80: 31-32; 
Record 83: 8-12) wherein Dennis Sykes' deposition says: 
"Mr. Morris replied that he had been into 
the bank and had already brought his payments 
completely current, having just within 
the past few days paid a ma]or amount 
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covering some months, receipts of which 
perhaps had not reached Utah through 
the mails". [Emphasis supplied] 
The bank's records submitted by respondent as Exhibit 5 
show that the statement was a fraudulent misrepresentation of 
the status of his accounts, no payments having been made after 
August .2, 1976. 
These ongoing defaults, no efforts to correct the 
known delinquency and oral and written misrepresentations that 
he had brought the contract current, clouded by the letters 
claiming to have extra cash on hand to buy other parcels, 
preclude respondent's right to ask the Court to grant him 
equitable relief. He has not done equity and cannot ask the 
Court to grant equity and impose the loss on appellant. 
The trial court should have denied him relief and 
should have enforced the contract right of the appellant-seller 
to retake possession of the property without reimbursement to 
respondent. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S RETAKING 
WAS AN UNREASONABLE FORFEITURE. 
Under Alaska law the reasonableness of a forfeiture 
of the payments paid under a land purchase contract are determined 
by all of the circumstances leading up to the termination of 
contract and the circumstances pertaining at the time of the 
termination and thereafter. 
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At the time of the execution of the purchase contract 
and the execution of the escrow documents, these papers were 
read orally, each individually, in-detail by appellant Sykes 
to respondent in the preparing attorney's office (Record 256: 
5-20). At that time Mr. Sykes informed respondent that he 
only had a thirty-day grace period and ~hat was all. (Record 
258:6-18) The escrow papers provide that the bank is to apply 
the proceeds of the monies received to the debt upon the pro-
perty owed by appellant Sykes. (Record 243:1-13) On December 
3, 1975 appellant Sykes sent the first notice of delinquency 
(Ex. 2) to Mr. Morris. (Record 243:12-23) Morris received 
that notice and was aware of the request to correct the de-
linquency. (Record 211:21-24) Sykes sent the second notice of 
delinquency and demand for payment of the five delinquent 
installments on December 29, 1975 (Ex. 2; Record 271:24-30; 
272:1-5). Mr. Morris received that letter informing him of a 
potential termination (Record 211:25-27). He was aware that 
Exhibit 3 notified him that he was $1,750.00 delinquent, or 
five installments at that time. {Record 212:1-6) He was 
further aware of the demand to correct the delinquency. (Record 
212:7-8 and 23-30; 213:1-2) 
Instead of responding by correcting the delinquency, 
Mr. Morris sent a letter to Mr. Sykes (Ex. 14) in which he 
misrepresented that he had sent payments to the bank, which did 
not show on the bank's record. (Record 213:17-22, 27-30) From 
that point forward he never made any attempt to correct the 
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five delinquent installments. (Record 223:4-7) In the summer 
of 1976 Morris knew he had not paid the July and August payments 
to the bank. (Record 228:9-17) During this period of delin-
quency, Mr. Morris continued to make overtures for purchase of 
lots 13 and 14. Morris made further representation that he had 
extra money on hand if he could get a discount on Musk Ox. 
(Record 230:17-30; Record 231:1-8; Ex. 17) 
In telephone conversation by respondent to Mr. 
Sykes on October 2, respondent told Sykes that he would person-
ally go to the bank and clarify the question of the delinquency 
because he said he was current and there was no problem on 
his account record. (Record 278:9-30) In the later October 
14 telephone call respondent reiterated that he had been to 
the bank and was current. (Record 280:26-30) Sykes gave 
Morris a deadline to bring the account current immediately. 
(Record 276:21-24) and made oral demand for him to keep the 
account current or the contract would be terminated and the 
property would be repossessed. (Record 281:13-17 and 25-30) 
During these communications between the parties, 
at no time did Sykes ever lead respondent to believe that 
it was not necessary for him to keep the monthly payments on 
the contract current. (Record 226:14-26) Respondent never 
gave notice to Sykes that he was not going to continue making 
the monthly payments and consistently misrepresented that he 
had brought the account current. (Record 226:26-30; Record 
-27-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
227:1-7) Respondent never informed Sykes that he was holding 
back on the payments. (Record 227:30; Record 228:1-2) All 
of this occurred during a time when respondent was mailing all 
the payments under the contract (Record 220:6-12), had a per-
sonal knowledge that monthly payments were required under the 
contract and under the escrow (Record 220:19-22), had personal 
knowledge and had been informed that Mr. Sykes depended upon 
Mr. Morris to make the .payments to the bank escrow because 
of his necessities in meeting the obligations on the mortgage 
on the same property. (Ex. 3) In as many as 15 telephone 
conversations between the parties, Morris never told Sykes 
that he was not meeting the monthly payments to the bank and 
consistently misrepresented that he had been to the bank, had 
checked his own account and had brought the account current. 
(Record 227: 12-16) In view of the fact of the repeated delin-
quencies and defaults of respondent, his lack of good faith in 
performing under the contract, and the demands of the bank to 
bring the amount current (Exs. 28 and 30) respondent was given 
oral notice of impending termination in the October 2 and 14 
telephone calls (Record 169:16-20). On November 11 the bank 
closed the escrow and forwarded the escrow papers in accordance 
with the escrow agreement to appellant Sykes. Sykes thereupon 
recorded the Quit Claim Deed from Morris to Sykes in accordance 
with the escrow agreement and the contract and in performance 
of the contract terms. 
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In view of the difficulties imposed upon the~the 
respondent: 
(a) the fact that the property was subject 
to foreclosure by the bank; 
(b) the seasonal sale of real estate in 
Alaska (Record 300:11-19); 
(c) the difficulty of sale of real estate in 
Alaska, particularly the Fairbanks area in midwinter 
(Record 300:38-30); 
(d) Sykes' inability to bring the account 
current (Record 300:20-26); 
(e) the efforts of Sykes to sell the property 
in the winter (Record 301:1-30; 302:1-30); 
(f) the fact that Sykes only recovered the 
amount of the unpaid balance without any windfall 
gain (Record 303:17-301 304:1); 
(g) and in fact received less than he 
would have received under the completion of the 
contract by Morris had Morris kept the contract 
current (Record 304:5-10). 
this forfeiture of payments was reasonable. The 
multitude of facts and the recognition by the Alaska Courts 
of the rights of a contract seller to forfeit payments on the 
failure of the buyer to make payments, coupled with the fact 
that Morris' own defaults and misrepresentations had created 
all of the problems, compels a conclusion that the retaking 
of the property by the Sykes in conformity with the contract 
terms was not an unreasonable forfeiture and the Court's ruling 
that it was an unreasonable forefeiture was in error. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF THE INTENDED SALE AND REA-
SONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE DEFENDANT WHOLE BEFORE 
THE SALE WAS MADE. 
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To evaluate whether respondent was entitled to addi-
tional notice before the sale of the property by appellant, 
the court must review what had transpired. 
There was a long history of delinquency, not entirely 
known to appellant because it had been clouded by a pattern of 
misrepresentation by the respondent: 
(a) claiming payment not credited, which in 
fact were false (Ex. 14, Appendix A); 
(b) claiming additional funds on hand for 
more land when still five months delinquent (Ex. 17) 
(c) claims that he would go to the bank and 
verify delinquency was cleared up (Record 81:13-16); 
(d) False claims that he had been to the 
bank and in past few days had paid major amounts and 
brought the account completely current (Record 83:8-13). 
This preamble leading up to the termination of the contract 
and escrow on November 11, 1976 was followed by another history 
of failures on the part of respondent. On November 18 in 
telephone conversations between Sykes and respondent, Mr. Morris wa1 
informed that he had been terminated; that he had been mis-
representing the payments and was greatly delinquent (Record 
288:6-30). In that conversation Mr. Sykes reviewed with 
respondent the notices that he had been sent and the misrepre-
sentations of having brought the payments current. Respondent's 
response was: "So what if the account was delinquent and the 
bank records are correct, so what difference does it make". 
(Record 288:9-23) In that same conversation on November 18, 
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1976 Mr. Sykes informed respondent that if he wished to rein-
state he could do so and set forth what the reinstatement terms 
would be (Record 289:1-7). On November 19, 1976 appellant 
followed that up with a reinstatement offer (Ex. 29; Record 
289:9-19). 
At no time after the termination did Morris ever 
tender cash or a cashier's check to anyone to correct the 
delinquencies and so t~stified. (Record 224:24-30). The 
attorney for Mr. Sykes sent a reinstatement letter to respon-
dent (Ex. 10). Respondent responded to Mr. Hibbert's rein-
statement letter and informed him that he did not wish to 
reinstate (Record 249:9-16, Ex. 11) Respondent rejected the 
reinstatment offers (Record 249 and 250). Respondent was given 
several offers to reinstate (Record 178:10-30; Record 179:15-29). 
Those reinstatement offers were before the trial court at the 
trial (Record 291:1-25). After numerous communications follow-
~ ing termination and the lapse of the period of time from 
November 11, 1976 to February 9, 1977 and in face of the bank's 
notice of acceleration and forfeiture (Ex. 30) it was error 
for the trial court to rule that Sykes was required to give a 
notice of intent to sell and additional opportunity for 
respondent to purchase the property prior to the sale. 
CONCLUSION 
While it is true that in reviewing an equity decision 
this Court can examine both the law and the facts, in the 
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final analysis, this Court must decide not whether rules of law 
were followed, but whether justice and equity were fairly given 
to the parties. 
The result of the decision 0£ the trial court must 
be viewed in that light. 
In this matter, appellant performed exactly as the 
contract required, never being in default. 
Appellant, in the face of repeated reports from the 
bank that repsondent was grossly delinquent, continued to give 
the benefit of the doubt to respondent because respondent was 
transmitting oral and written false claims that he had made 
payments for which he had not been given credit or had brought 
the account current. When he was eventually made aware of the 
defaults and misrepresentations he followed the parties agree-
ments and terminated the escrow and recorded the Quit Claim 
Deed. 
Respondent had full control of the matters. He 
paid every payment personally, knew he was required to pay 
$350.00 each month. Nevertheless, he falsely represented pay-
ments never paid, claimed records,he said,showed him to be 
current, claimed he had brought the account current and claimed 
he had corrected all delinquency. He further knew he had paid 
no monthly payments after July 8, 1976. He never tendered 
funds to bring current or to pay off the balance. He rejected 
reinstatement offers and failed to respond to the attorney's 
final letters on reinstatement. 
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When weighing the propriety of the trial court's 
decision, this Court should conclude that it put the burden 
of loss on the nondefaulting party and imposed practically no 
losses upon the party with unclean hands, the party who caused 
the forfeiture and forced sale of the property. 
In this case of unclean hands the Court should not 
allow the facilities of the Courts to be used to aid the wrong-
doer. 
It is respectfully requested that this Court reverse 
with instructions to enter judgment of no cause for the respon-
dent. 
Dated this 18th day of April, 1980. 
m,£7,~~ M. Dayle Jef~ / 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief were mailed to A. H. Boyce, Attorney for Respondent, 500 
American Savings Building, 61 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 by placing a copy of same in the United States mails, 
postage prepaid, this 18th day of April, 1980. 
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Payments Required 
By Contract 
11/1/74 - $1,000.00 
12/1/74 - 350.00 
1/1/75 350.00 
2/1/75 350.00 
2/1/75 5,000.00 
3/1/75 350.00 
4/1/75 350.00 
5/1/75 350.00 
6/1/75 350.00 
7/1/75 350.00 
8/1/75 350.00 
8/1/75 5,000.00 
9/1/75 350.00 
10/1/75 - 350.00 
11/1/75 - 350.00 
12/1/75 - 350.00 
L/1/76 350.00 
APPENDIX "A" 
Payments Paid By 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
$1,000.00 - 11/ /74 
(Exhibit 13) 
3 so • o o - l/ a I 7 5 
$5,699.00 - 2/4/75 
597.46 - 5/7/75 
449.95 - 6/ /75 
$5,323.25 - 9/9/75 
700.00 - 12/8/75 
-34-
Delinquency Status 
Of Contract On 
Selected Dates 
Current 
$100.00 delinquent 
Current 
3 Installments delinquen 
$1,050.00 
12/3/75 - 6 Install-
ments $ 2, 1 O O delinquent 
(Exhibit 2) 
12/29/75 - Exhibit 3 
Demand for $1, 7 50. 00 
5 Installments 
1/1/76 - 5 Install-
ments $1, 7 50 delinquent 
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Payments Required 
By Contract 
2/1/76 350.00 
2/1/76 - $3,000.00 
3/1/76 
4/1/76 
5/1/76 
6/1/76 
7/1/76 
8/1/76 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
8/1/76 - $3,000.00 
9/1/76 
10/1/76 -
11/1/76 -
350.00 
350.00 
350.00 
24 Monthly 
Installments 
Required 
Payments Paid By 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
350.00 - 1/27/76 
350.00 - 2/4/76 
$3,316.50 - 2/20/76 
350.00 3/12/76 
350.00 - 3/31/76 
$1,044.00 - 7/8/76 
$2,985.00 - 8/2/76 
15 Monthly 
Installments 
Paid 
-35-
Delinquency Status 
Of Contract On 
Selected Dates 
2/11/76 - Plaintiff 
misrepresents paymentE 
(Exhibit 14) 
4/1/76 - 5 Install-
ments $1,750 delinquer 
5 Installments 
$1,750.00 delinquent 
11/1/76 - 9 Install-
ments Delinquent 
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